











































































































































































































































































Research exploiting new longitudinal business datasets has shown that firms in narrowly defined
industries exhibit very different outcomes in terms of productivity, wages, growth, and survival.
These firms also exhibit very different choices in terms of technology, organizational structure, size,
and factor mix.  It is apparent that there is much heterogeneity and persistence in the ways firms
produce and do business, and that learning and selection effects play large roles in these processes.  In
this paper we use a unique new database with longitudinal information on both firms and their
workforce to find that this heterogeneity and persistence in productivity both extends to and is related
to firm workforce composition.  We propose a framework where the underlying source of these
different outcomes is differences in firms’ endowment of key factors such as technology, capital,
organizational structure, and the ability of managers.  New firms that make mistakes in recognizing
their initial endowment either adjust their workforce as they learn about their capabilities or exit
through a competitive selection mechanism.
This study follows in the footsteps of recent studies using longitudinal business data and the much
larger and more established literature using worker level data.  While the former contributes to
understanding the nature and sources of firm heterogeneity and the latter to understanding worker
heterogeneity, this paper contributes to the gap in knowledge about the connections between the two –
and hence a key piece of the story underlying the interactions of workers and firms.  Casual
observation suggests that these interactions are important: similar firms, even when faced with similar
markets, make very different choices of workers.  For example, visits to various individual businesses
will reveal different types of workers at each, and repeat visits will confirm that although the workers
may have changed, the age, gender, and education level of the replacement workers are similar.
Recent empirical evidence using longitudinal matched employer-employee data confirms this
anecdotal impression: in their sample of long-lived large firms, Haltiwanger, Lane, and Spletzer2
(1999) found that employers choose very different types of workforces and productivity levels, even
within relatively narrow industries, and these choices are quite persistent over time.
Figure 1 illustrates this heterogeneity and persistence in workforce mix, productivity, and earnings
per worker.  Using a sample of long-lived single establishments in Maryland, the upper left panel of
this figure plots the proportion of the workplace that is female for each firm in 1986 against the same
proportion for the same firm in 1996, the upper right panel plots the proportion of the workplace that
is highly educated for each firm in 1986 against the same proportion for the same firm in 1996, the
lower left panel of this figure plots the productivity in 1986 against the productivity for the same firm
in 1996, and the lower right panel plots the analogous relationship for earnings per worker.
1  The data
show quite dramatic heterogeneity and persistence in firm personnel practices and firm outcomes.
That is, firms not only choose widely different workforces (the percent female and percent highly
educated range from 0% to 100%) but the result that workforce composition, productivity, and
earnings per worker are very similar a decade later suggests that these firms are choosing their
workforces quite deliberately.
2
Such a deliberate choice of worker mix is likely to be complementary to other choices of the firm,
such as technology and organizational practice, and to other intrinsic characteristics of the business,
such as managerial or entrepreneurial ability.  Consideration of these relationships leads one to think
about the complex matching and sorting processes that must underlie the connection between firm and
worker outcomes.  In particular, it raises questions about the relationship between wages, productivity,
and worker mix, and the way in which firms – particularly new firms - make such widely differing
                                                     
1  A description of the data underlying Figure 1 is provided in section 6.  Note that 4-digit effects have been
removed from the observations underlying Figure 1.  Note that we find similar patterns of heterogeneity and
persistence for other measures of worker characteristics including other categories of education, age and foreign
born.
2  For all cases, we present a 10 percent random sample of our data.  For percent highly educated, we only show
range from 0 to 0.4 since the mean is relatively low.  In all cases, the persistence is measured as the first order
AR coefficient from a regression of the 96 value on the 86 value -- for percent female, the AR1 coefficient is3
choices.  This raises other issues about the role of learning and selection in this process.  In this paper
we both propose a framework where the underlying source of different outcomes in both workforce
composition and productivity is differences in firms’ endowment of key factors such as technology,
capital, organizational structure, and the ability of managers, and investigate the implications of the
model using a new longitudinal matched employer-employee dataset.
Our key empirical results are:
i)  We find substantial and persistent differences in earnings per worker, output per worker, and
worker mix across businesses within narrowly defined industries, which remain even after
controlling for other observable characteristics.
ii)  We find that new businesses exhibit even greater heterogeneity in earnings and productivity
than do mature businesses, but that they adjust to the mature business pattern as they age.  The
adjustment process, while different for earnings and productivity, is consistent both with firms
learning as they age and with the exit of “mistake” prone firms.
iii)  The dynamics of the reduction in productivity heterogeneity of new firms as they age is both
complex and very different from the dynamic reduction of earnings heterogeneity.
The paper is organized as follows.  We first set the stage by describing how our approach
draws on the previous literature and explore some of the implications of Figure 1 a bit more. We then
develop a descriptive model that synthesizes a number of these ideas.  We follow this by describing
the construction of a linked employer employee dataset, which we use to empirically test our key
hypotheses.  We conclude by summarizing our contribution.
2.  Background
The framework presented here views the choice of worker mix as part of the experimentation
of how best to create and run a business.  It is clear from the emerging literature using linked
                                                                                                                                                                     
0.82; for highly educated the coefficient is 0.45; for productivity the coefficient is 0.47, for earnings the
coefficient is 0.45.4
employer-employee data that worker heterogeneity and firm heterogeneity are closely linked.  Our
earlier work (as well as that of others) suggest firms ultimately locate along a
productivity/earnings/skill locus with some firms being high productivity, high wage, and high skill
firms while others are low productivity, low wage, and low skill firms.  In the current paper, we
provide further analysis of the connection between productivity, earnings, and worker mix and, in
particular, focus on the learning and selection dynamics of new businesses and the role of worker mix
in these dynamics.  Prior to beginning our own analysis, it is useful to review briefly key strands of the
theoretical and empirical literature on firm dynamics that provide background and additional
motivation for our analysis.
First, firm performance and behavior, even within quite narrowly defined industries, is quite
heterogeneous.  Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) document the large magnitude of job creation
and destruction and the dominance of idiosyncratic factors in accounting for the observed large pace of
job reallocation.  Spletzer (2000) reports that forty percent of new businesses die within three years of
their birth, and more than half of all jobs destroyed in a three-year period are due to the death of
establishments.  In addition to growth and survival, firm heterogeneity in wages and productivity has
been documented by Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999), Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (1998),
and Dunne, Foster, Haltiwanger, and Troske (2000), amongst others.
Second, complementarities in the firm's production process can lead to a choice of worker
skill mix that varies across firms.  Kremer's (1993) model of production as a series of tasks where
quantity can not be substituted for quality provides insights into how workers of similar skill will
match together in firms.  Empirical evidence that worker skill is positively correlated across
occupations within establishments is provided by Lane, Salmon, and Spletzer (1999).  Milgrom and
Roberts (1990) discuss the business strategy of exploiting complementarities and the resulting
clustering of marketing, production, and organization.  Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997) find
that innovative employment practices tend to be complements, and these human resource policies are5
important determinants of productivity.  And Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (1999) describe how
information technology is complementary with the organization of work, including the demand for
workers of various skill levels.
Third, there is considerable persistence in outcomes such as wages and productivity across
mature businesses.  See, for example, Baily, Hulten, and Campbell (1992) with regard to productivity,
and Doms, Dunne, and Troske (1997) with regard to wages.  In addition, there is considerable
persistence in measures of choice of technology, factor mix, and worker mix across mature businesses
-- see Doms, Dunne, and Troske (1997) and Haltiwanger, Lane, and Spletzer (1999).
Fourth, the idea that learning and selection dynamics are important for firm dynamics and
heterogeneity across firms is most notably attributable to Jovanovic (1982), but also by Ericson and
Pakes (1995).  In this vein, Jovanovic develops the notion that efficient firms survive and others die.
Consistent with the learning and selection models, Evans (1987), Audretsch and Mahmood (1995),
and Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1989) find that establishment specific characteristics such as size
and age are important contributors to the success or failure of manufacturing establishments.  Burgess,
Lane, and Stevens (2000) find that firms both at the beginning and end of their lifecycle have much
higher turnover rates than mature and successful firms do, and Lane, Isaac, and Stevens (1996) suggest
that this contributes to firm exit.  Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (1998) note that a common finding
in the emerging literature is that low productivity is an excellent predictor of exit.
The evidence of tremendous heterogeneity in outcomes such as productivity, employment, and
wages (both in levels and growth rates) across businesses in the same narrowly defined industries is at
the core of this burgeoning literature.  In the next section, we provide some further analysis of the
nature of this heterogeneity.  We think this analysis is interesting in its own right but also helps in
thinking about the connections between productivity, earnings, and worker mix.
3.  The Sources of Firm Heterogeneity6
The motivating force for this paper was presented in Figure 1, which showed that businesses in the
same year exhibit widely different productivity, wages, and worker mixes – and that these differences
are persistent.  What might drive this?  The most obvious argument is that this persistence and
heterogeneity reflects different production techniques: different industries, quite naturally, require
different levels of capital intensity, or organizational structure, and that this is reflected in the
workforce composition.  In this view, if we hone in closely enough to industry characteristics, the
observed persistence and heterogeneity should be reduced: firms within very narrowly defined
industries should choose roughly similar methods of production and consequently workforces.  Figure
1 goes a long way in this direction by controlling for 4-digit effects but it may be that even narrower
classification is required for this purpose.
In fact, we have a unique opportunity to examine this, because we can link our analytical dataset
(described in detail in section 5 below) to internal Census files with detailed firm level responses to
the quinquennial economic Censuses in 1987 and 1992.  In Figures 2 and 3, we recreate the
relationship described in Figure 1 for two detailed five-digit industries: restaurants and plumbing
businesses.
3  For each of these industries, we examine the heterogeneity and persistence for all
businesses, and then businesses that fit into a very narrow set of what one might think of as observable
dimensions of differences across firms.
For the restaurant industry we present eight panels of firm level scatter plots on the relationship
between variables on worker mix, earnings and productivity for the firm in 1987 against the
corresponding variable in 1992.  The left column of panels present these relationships for the entire
restaurant industry in the state of Maryland; the right-hand column for the subset of restaurants that
have table service, that are in metropolitan area in the state of Maryland, and where the average
customer spends the same amount (within a $5 range).  By restricting our attention in the right panels
                                                     
3  We chose these industries both because of an abundance of data points and because the questions asked of
firms in these industries were particularly well suited to our analytical purpose.7
to the narrow set of restaurants on several dimensions, we think we have come fairly close to finding
firms with observationally equivalent sets of characteristics.
Since we are looking within a relatively narrow five digit industry, it is “surprising” (although this
mimics the results that controlled for 4-digit industry) to find considerable heterogeneity and
persistence in the measures of worker mix, earnings, and productivity in the left panels for the entire
restaurant industry.  As noted, this “surprising” result may simply reflect observable differences in
products and services provided – that is for the restaurant industry, some datapoints are for the fast
food restaurants while others are expensive, fancy restaurants.  The right panels of Figure 2 depict the
same scatter plots focusing on the businesses with seemingly very similar observable characteristics.
The striking finding is that there remains substantial heterogeneity and persistence in earnings,
productivity, and worker mix even within as narrow a group as can be defined using detailed survey
data.
4
We repeat this same exercise for plumbing businesses in Figure 3.  On the left hand column we
recreate Figure 1 for all firms in the industry.  On the right column we subset the firms to include
those in the top decile of capital expenditures and capital assets.  Again, despite controlling for these
observable differences, we still find similar patterns – substantial heterogeneity and persistence across
businesses not only in the same narrowly defined industry but also controlling for various detailed
characteristics of the business.
Our interpretation of these findings of large residual heterogeneity and persistence is that they are
prima facie evidence that there are some inherently unobservable (or difficult to measure) dimensions
of firm heterogeneity.  Indeed, this would mirror the prior research surveyed in Section 2, which
documented substantial differences in capital intensities as well as propensities to adopt advanced
technologies, organizational and human resource practices across business even in the same 4-digit
                                                     
4  The autocorrelation coefficients from simple linear regression fit through these points is positive and
significant for all of the plots in Figure 2 and 3.8
industries.  In our view, these differences are likely to reflect, at least in part, inherently difficult to
measure characteristics such as managerial ability or related organizational practices.
5
4.  Theoretical Underpinnings – Learning and Selection
The preceding section described differences in productivity levels, workforce composition, and
earnings for long-lived, mature businesses.  In order to understand these different outcomes, we argue
in this paper that the heterogeneity in each of these is a manifestation of an underlying quasi-fixed
heterogeneity in firm type.  This also explains the persistence in outcomes: since firm type is quasi-
fixed, the manifestation of type should not change quickly.  In the model we sketch in this section, we
make three key assumptions about differences across firms.  First, we assume that there are some
underlying differences in firm type, labeled “k” for now.  Second, we assume that firms of different
types have incentives to use different mixes of workers through the nature of the interaction between
firm type and the productivity of different types of workers.  Third, since some aspects of firm type are
arguably unobservable even to the firm itself initially, newly born firms learn and evolve towards their
“long run” type (or potentially exit as discussed below).  In what follows, we first focus on the nature
of the connection between firm type and worker mix.  We then consider the role of uncertainty, the
effect of this on the learning of surviving firms, the associated belief distribution in this learning, and
the consequences for the choice of worker mix.  After discussing the optimal choice of worker mix for
surviving firms, we discuss the factors that determine selection.
4A.  The link between firm type and worker mix
We only sketch a model here, drawing heavily on the literature, in order to motivate and help
interpret the empirical exercises we consider in section 5.  The simple descriptive model focuses on
the choice of worker mix and abstracts from scale effects.  As such, we take the size of businesses as
                                                     
5  It is important to emphasize that in all of the results to be presented in this paper control for 4-digit industry,
which is a basic control for observable differences across businesses.  There may well be, of course, other
important observable dimensions of firm heterogeneity.  As such, we believe that it would be a fruitful path for9
given and develop the model focusing on the determinants of output per worker and the mix of
workers by worker type within a business, although many of the same factors that we emphasize that
influence mix also influence scale.
6
We begin by assuming that the observed firm heterogeneity fundamentally reflects some
variation in business type – the idiosyncratic ability of managers, the firm's organizational practices or
policies, or the choice of productive inputs such as technology, physical capital, or organizational
capital.  In what follows, we refer to this type as “k” with high “k” firms inherently more productive.
For now, it is useful to think of k as fixed but in practice it is better to think of k as changing either
slowly or, even better, infrequently (as when a firm adopts a technology through an investment spike -
- see, for example, Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Power (1999)).  Following the learning literature, we
also argue that firms are not likely to be fully aware of their type at birth, and initially “guess” their
type to be K.  Since k is not directly observable to the firm, but output is, firms have to revise their
priors each period based upon observations of their output.  However, a firm’s ability to extract
information on its type is clouded to some extent by unobservable profit (i.e., productivity, demand,
and cost) shocks.
Furthermore, assume that output per worker is given by θ f(k,s) (suppressing time subscripts),
where θ  is initially assumed to be a random (i.i.d.) profit shock, s is skill mix, f is increasing in its
arguments and the cross partial between k and s is positive (i.e., there is k-skill complementarity).
7
                                                                                                                                                                     
future research to explore on an industry-by-industry basis other observable dimensions of differences across
businesses.
6  For example, Lucas (1977) develops a model of the size distribution of employment that depends upon
heterogeneity in the managerial ability across businesses.  The latter is part of what we have mind as “k” in the
analysis that follows.  In the Lucas (1977) model, the most productive entrepreneurs employ more workers but
do not capture the entire market because of diseconomies of control – even the most productive individual can
only effectively control a limited size operation.  While this is outside the scope of our model, this argument is
implicitly important in our context as well in that it provides one potential explanation for why the high and low
“k” firms can operate simultaneously.
7  The assumption that θ  is i.i.d. is not critical and likely unrealistic – we assume this for now to make some of
the simple illustrative analysis easier to present.10
Firms observe total output each period after decisions for the period are made, but do not observe k or
θ  directly.  The observation of output implies there is learning over time about true k.
We specify wages as having two components: one a function of skill and one reflecting the
ability of workers in a firm to extract rents (and or more generally internal labor market considerations
that might generate firm specific components to wages – in what follows we use “rent sharing” as a
catch all label for such effects).  Specifically, wages are given by w(s) = ω (s) + δ EΠ , where ω (s) is the
reservation wage for workers of skill s (with ω ’>0), and δ EΠ  is the rent sharing premium such that
δ <1 and Π  is the surplus in the period (see below).  In principle, we permit δ  to vary over time (e.g.,
over the life cycle of the firm) and to be idiosyncratic and stochastic.  Put differently, one source of
heterogeneity across businesses may be the nature of the internal labor market and, accordingly, the
earnings profiles of businesses may change as the firm ages and changes its internal paysetting
structure.  Our descriptive model includes such firm-specific effects in a crude fashion to recognize
their potential empirical relevance – modeling the nature of the firm-specific components of wage
determination in this context should be a high priority for future research.  In this regard, we recognize
that our descriptive model is missing potentially interesting aspects of the firm-specific components of
wages.  It could be, for example, that δ  not only varies with time but with s – many interesting internal
labor market models may yield incentives for varying the wage differential based upon worker
characteristics.
In this setting, expected profits in a given period are given by (normalizing the output price to
one for now):
E[(1-δ ){θ f(k,s) – ω (s) - F} | K],  (1)11
where F represents fixed costs of operating in each period and K represents the belief about type in
each period.
8  In our simple model, firms will learn about their type and update K each period based
upon prior observations.  Then they will either decide to shut down (selection) or decide to continue to
operate.  If the latter, they will choose s, and generate their output.
This generates several concrete predictions.  First, in the absence of uncertainty and rent-
sharing, the choice of s each period will satisfy θ∂ f(k,s)/∂ s = ω ’(s) and k-skill complementarity implies
that firms with higher k will have higher s and higher wages.  Second, the slope of the wage and
productivity profiles should be the same for given k.  In this simple case, systematic firm productivity
differentials, wage differentials, and workforce composition differences are entirely driven by
differences in k.
The intuition of this result can be seen in figure 4, where we have graphed the productivity
profiles for firms with three different values of k (k3 > k2 > k1).  For any given skill level s, firms that
are type k3 are the most productive, firms that are type k1 are the least productive, and firms that are
type k2 are in between.  Expanding this simple three firm example to a continuum of k, the points of
tangency where marginal productivity equals marginal wages sketch out the equilibrium line of
observed productivity/skill combinations (for simplicity in drawing the figure, we have assumed that
wages are linear in skills).  If we interpret skill on the horizontal axis as an index of observable worker
characteristics, this line can be thought of a possible underlying theoretical justification for the
statistically significant productivity/skill relationship found for long-lived large firms by Haltiwanger,
Lane, and Spletzer (1999).
9
                                                     
8  We assume conditions are such that expected profits are a strictly concave function of s.  In many of our
examples, we assume f is strictly concave in s and ω  is linear in s.
9  It is worth noting that there are a number of potential reasons why high “k” and low “k” firms can both exist in
the same market.  If k is managerial ability, economies of scope as in Lucas (1977) can limit the size of the
business.  If k is type of technology adopted, then costs of adopting and learning new skills may mean that there
is heterogeneity in technologies being used as in Cooper, Haltiwanger and Power (1999) or Caselli (1999).  It
might also be that we want to think about k as the persistent component of idiosyncratic technology or cost
shocks as in Hopenhayn (1992) or Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993).  Such idiosyncratic technology and cost12
4B.  The role of uncertainty about type and the implications for learning
In the more general case, with uncertainty about firm type, the skill mix s will be chosen so
that E[θ∂ f(k,s)/∂ s | K] = ω ’(s).  We still obtain the result that firms with higher K choose higher s and
have higher wages.  However, as is obvious from the first order condition, uncertainty about k implies
that the slopes of the wage and productivity profiles need not be the same, even for firms with the
same k.  Figure 5 provides a visual interpretation of this.  Suppose we have three firms in an entering
cohort, each of which has the same k, but each of which initially believes it has a different type K3 >
K2 > K1.  At birth, then, they choose different skill levels based upon their belief about K.  However,
because productivity is determined by actual type as well as the skill mix of workers, the optimistic
firm's realization of productivity is less than anticipated.  Similarly, the pessimistic firm's realization
of productivity is greater than what it expected.  Only firm 2 is at a point on the long-run (no
uncertainty) productivity/skill locus.  Firms 1 and 3 then adjust their skill level along the productivity
curve, so that eventually they end up with a workforce composition appropriate to their type (and in
this case the three firms with the same k would end up with the same workforce compositions and the
same productivity level).
While the specific quantitative implications for productivity and worker mix dynamics depend
upon the precise assumptions about the initial distribution of beliefs, there are a few key aspects of the
implications illustrated that do not depend upon the precise assumptions regarding this distribution.
                                                                                                                                                                     
shocks might relate to the location of production or the specific technology adopted (and thus be related to some
of these other factors as well).  It is the case that the equilibrating forces act somewhat differently across these
different possibilities.  As noted above, in Lucas (1977) the differences in managerial ability and the economies
of scope yield differences in the size of businesses (and thus determine the equilibrium size distribution).  In
Caselli (1999), there is some general capital that is perfectly mobile and thus sites that have adopted the latest
technology have not only better capital but more capital.  In Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1992), labor is the only
input considered, labor is subject to adjustment costs and is subject to decreasing returns and there are entry costs
(therefore the mass of entrants does not take over the market nor does any individual business).  These different
models and associated equilibrating forces have implications for the dispersion of productivity across businesses.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to specify fully the nature of the factors generating the productivity
dispersion and the associated equilibrating forces. mapping the observed patterns and evolution of dispersion in
productivity (and earnings) across businesses to the specific implications of these alternative models is an
important area for future research.13
For one, Figure 5 helps illustrate the more general prediction that businesses will learn that they have
made mistakes about their type and will adjust their mix of workers in a systematic fashion:
overestimates of type result in decreased s; underestimates result in increased s.
10  A second key
related prediction that does not depend upon the initial distribution of beliefs is that the deviations
from the long run profile should be reduced over time.  In the limit, only the idiosyncratic productivity
shocks should generate deviations in the long run.  Wages, productivity, and worker mix are all still
related through their common relationship to k, but the tightness of that relationship, as measured by a
reduction in the variance of the deviations, increases as a cohort ages.  The following example helps
illustrate the working of the simple model, as well as the role of initial beliefs.
4C.  A simple example
To more fully understand the implications of this model for learning dynamics and the link
between wages, productivity, and skill mix, it is useful to consider a simple example.  Suppose we
have the following production function (for 0<α <1) and wage function (where we have abstracted
from rent sharing – a point we return to below):
α θ ks y = ,      s s ϖ ω = ) ( (2).





















Equations (2) and (3) imply that as firms get older and learn about their type, the dispersion of skills, s,
and the dispersion of productivity, y, depend directly on the dispersion of beliefs about type, K.
                                                     
10  Note that it should be clear that even if firms had the same initial belief, firms with negative errors (overly
optimistic) will decrease their skill mix while firms with positive errors (overly pessimistic) will increase their
skill mix.
11  The assumption that θ  is i.i.d. makes this expression simple.  Observations of past output yields information
about k but no information about future productivity shocks.  For this example, we have also normalized the
mean of θ  to one.14
Accordingly, the changes in the dispersion of mix, productivity, and wages depend upon the evolution
of var(K).
To consider the empirical implications, it is helpful to take logs of the production function,
defining  ) ln( ~ • ≡ • , which yields  η α + = s y ~ ~ .  The “error” term in this expression has information on
both type and productivity shocks:  θ η
~ ~
+ = k .  Clearly, estimating a simple regression of y on s does
not yield an estimate of α , since s and k are positively correlated and k is unobserved at least to the















E α β (4)
 The “omitted variable” bias from regressing   y ~on  s ~ differs for mature and young
businesses, and hence help us understand the role of learning about type on the productivity/skill
relationship.  For mature businesses, where K = k, estimating this regression yields the slope of the
long run profile (which we refer to below as β ) depicted in Figures 4 and 5.  For young businesses
that have uncertainty about their type, the relationship between skills and productivity depends on the
structure of their initial beliefs.  If the initial distribution is similar to a type of classical measurement
error (K = k + κ , where κ  is a random measurement error with mean zero), then learning effects as
firms converge to the long run profile will yield a reduction in overall dispersion in productivity, a
reduction in the dispersion of the worker mix, but an increase in the slope of the estimated
productivity/skill relationship as firms age.  If, in contrast, newly-born firms have identical ex ante
beliefs, then we would expect to see rising dispersion in both productivity and worker mix, but a
flattening of the slope of the estimated productivity/skill relationship as firms age.  Note that
regardless of the assumption about initial beliefs, the convergence to the long run profile implies that
residual deviations from the long run profile will diminish over time.15
In this simple example, the implied changes for wage dispersion are similar to those for
productivity on some dimensions but different on others.  The similarities arise because the dispersion
of wages depends upon the dispersion of s.  In the absence of rent sharing, the only effect of the
learning about k on wages is the direct effect through s.  In this case, the model predicts changes in the
dispersion in wages only due to systematic changes in the distribution of s, but does not predict
systematic changes in the estimated slope of the wage/skill profile or systematic changes in the
distribution of the unobservables (i.e., residuals).  With rent sharing, the qualitative predictions for the
distribution of wages begin, in principle, to mimic those for productivity.  Even here, the quantitative
predictions may be different given the nature of rent sharing.
On the learning side of the story, then, as firms’ age, declining uncertainty about firm type
leads to systematic changes in the skill mix and decreases in the residual dispersion in the relationship
between productivity and skills (with similar predictions potentially for wages).  Changes in overall
wage, productivity, and worker mix dispersion (and the estimated relationship between these) depend
upon the initial distribution of beliefs and the associated resolution of uncertainty.  We return to these
predictions when we discuss the empirical specification in section 5.
4D.  Selection
On the selection side, we draw heavily on the implications from the existing literature on
selection as we have little to add (theoretically) except for some modest refinements.  Following
Jovanovic (1982) and Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1989), we suppose that entering firms face the
uncertainty about type that we have already outlined, entry costs, and a fixed cost of operating in every
period (denoted F in the prior section).
12  In this environment, only firms with sufficiently high
expected k will enter.  The marginal entering firm will have zero expected discounted profits taking
                                                     
12  In a formal model of entry and exit, we might also want or need to guarantee some exit of mature businesses.
The latter could be generated from there being some probability of any given production site becoming
sufficiently unproductive (e.g., as in Davis and Haltiwanger (1990) or Ericson and Pakes (1995)) that it should16
into account the costs of entry.  However, given the learning as well as the fixed costs of operating
each period, some firms will learn that they have negative expected profits and exit.  The firms that are
more likely to exit are those with low k since they will be closer to the marginal firm.
In terms of observable implications, low k firms will tend to have both lower productivity and
lower “s”.  Putting these pieces together, we get some modest refinements of the typical predictions of
the selection literature.  The standard prediction is that low productivity firms are more likely to exit
and this reflects the fact that low productivity firms are more likely (on average) to have learned
through experience of producing that they are expected negative profit firms.  Our refinement is that
we should see that such marginal firms have also selected a low “s” and thus we should see that low
“s” predicts exit.  Errors should also provide information: firms that deviate from the long run profile
in the negative direction should also be more likely to exit since this yields information about the
learning about type.  That is, a negative error indicates that the firm is more likely to have
overestimated rather than underestimated its type and such firms will revise their expected type
downwards and be more likely to exit.
To sum up, like the standard selection model, firms that learn they are low productivity firms
are more likely to exit.  Our focus on the choice of worker mix suggests the following refinements.
First, the choice of mix will be correlated with k and productivity and thus should help predict exit.
Second, the component of productivity that is not predicted by worker mix may also have some
additional power to predict exit as this indicates the direction of learning.
5.  Empirical Specifications and Tests
The above theoretical discussion generates testable hypotheses about selection and the
evolution of productivity, wages, and worker mix as a cohort of businesses enters and ages.  We have
                                                                                                                                                                     
exit.  In terms of the model sketched above, this could be captured by assuming that there is a component of the
profit shock θ  that has this feature.17
specific predictions about the evolution of productivity and earnings as firms’ age and the role of
changes in the worker mix in this evolution.
The evolution of productivity and earnings can be traced empirically by using the following
specification following directly from the discussion in the previous section:
it t it it X y ε β + = ,( 5 )
Here yit is a measure of an outcome such as output per worker or payroll per worker, Xit is a vector of
worker characteristics, β t is the slope of the profile in the current year (and thus may not be the slope
of the long run profile) and ε it is the residual (reflecting a deviation from the current “profile”).
On the learning side, the theoretical predictions of changes in dispersion can be tested directly
using a Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) (hereafter JMP) full accounting approach to decompose
changes in variance of outcomes into changes in β ’s, changes in X’s, and changes in residuals.  That
is, by exploiting this specification for a cohort of entering business, we can examine the changes in the
dispersion of productivity and wages and the extent to which changes in the dispersion is accounted
for by changes in the distribution of observable and unobservable factors.
Our JMP full accounting distribution exercises are based upon exploiting the following two
closely related decompositions:
it t it it it it it X X v X y ε β β β β + − + = + = ) ( ,( 6 )
where β  represents a set of time invariant coefficient estimates and  t β  represents the estimated
coefficients for each age level of an entering cohort.  In this methodology, the distribution of the
outcome variable, y, is ultimately decomposed into three terms based upon the expressions on the right
of the second equal sign: the first term captures the influence of observable characteristics for given
β ’s, incorporation of the second term captures the influence of changing differentials associated with
the given characteristics, and incorporation of the third term captures the influence of unobservable18
factors.  However, as an intermediate step, it is useful to consider the simpler decomposition of y into
two terms given by the expressions to the right of the first equal sign: the first term captures as before
the influence of observable characteristics for given β ’s and the second term everything else.  This
simpler intermediate decomposition is useful in this context because the “error” term in this simpler
decomposition, ν it, can be interpreted as representing deviations from the long run profile.  Note that
by construction in what follows that performing the full 3-term decomposition automatically yields the
intermediate decomposition so we can characterize how the distribution of deviations from the long
term profile evolves over time.
To see how to use this decomposition for characterizing changing dispersion, consider using
this decomposition to decompose changes in the differential between the 90
th and 10
th percentile of y
for the surviving members of an entering cohort of businesses that we follow over successive years.
Using the first term in each of the above decompositions and constructing the implied 90-10
differential based upon this term alone for each year and then considering the change in this
differential over time provides a measure of the contribution of changing characteristics to the change
in overall dispersion.  Inclusion of the second term in the 3-way decomposition in a measure of the
predicted 90-10 differential incorporates the contribution of the changes in the β ’s.  The marginal
contribution of the changing β ’s is measured as the difference between the change in dispersion
generated by the first two terms from the change in dispersion generated from the first term.  In a
similar manner, the contribution of unobservables is generated by considering the change in dispersion
implied by all three terms less the change in dispersion implied by the first two terms alone.
13
                                                     
13  One issue that is relevant is that the ordering of the decomposition may matter here.  Covariance-like effects
on the components of the decomposition of the 90-10 can make the ordering important.  As such, appropriate
caution about the interpretation of the contribution of the terms is required.  Given the ordering we have chosen,
there is a clear interpretation of the contribution of the first term but the second term and its interpretation is
potentially impacted by covariance-like effects.  Note that regardless of the ordering the contribution of the
unobservables will be the same.  The ordering we have chosen is the natural one for the exercises we are
interested in – that is, we are especially interested in the contribution of changes in the distribution of worker
mix across businesses to changes in dispersion of productivity and earnings across businesses.  We have19
As noted above, we use the estimated coefficients from a balanced panel of mature businesses
to generate the “fixed” β ’s (the β  in the above equation).  The motivation for this -- influenced
largely by Figures 4 and 5 and our initial empirical work in Haltiwanger, Lane, and Spletzer (1999) --
is that mature businesses have presumably learned their type and thus the estimated coefficients will
not reflect errors in type.  The time varying β ’s are generated from estimation of the specification for
samples of entering cohort of businesses for each of the years that we follow over time.
The theory generates predictions about the changes in skill mix that should be observed for an
entering cohort of firms.  Firms that overestimate their type will decrease their skill mix while firms
that underestimate their type will increase their skill mix.  In addition, the magnitude of the skill
change will be greater the greater the initial mistake made by the firm.  These predictions can be tested
for entering cohorts of businesses by examining the relationship between changes in the skill mix and
the sign and magnitude of their errors.  To be specific, we construct a measure of predicted
productivity using the long run β ’s and the actual skill mix chosen by the business.  The difference
between actual and predicted productivity yields a measure of the “error” made by the entering
business (this measure of the error is captured as ν it in equation (6)).  A similar measure of the wage
“error” is also constructed.
Finally, on the selection side, the theory predicts that firms with observed initial low
productivity are more likely to fail.  It could be that the firm had expectations that it was a marginal
firm with a low k and therefore had also chosen a low s and therefore worker mix should help predict
exit.  Alternatively, the low observed productivity could be a surprise (and thus show up in the error
term) that indicates the firm overestimated its type and through learning the firm is more likely to exit.
We can test these predictions by examining the probability of exit as a function of initial productivity
                                                                                                                                                                     
considered the alternative ordering and briefly discuss the results of this alternative ordering in the results that
we present.20
as well as the magnitude and sign of the errors made in k.  The measure of the errors is constructed in
the manner discussed above.
6.  Longitudinal Linked Employer-Employee Data
In order to address these questions, we need a dataset that links workers to their employers,
provides information on the characteristics of both, and follows both over time.  We use three sources
of data to create our longitudinal linked employer-employee dataset.
14  Firm characteristics are
obtained from the Standard Statistical Establishment List (SSEL), which is the U.S. Census Bureau's
sampling frame for businesses in the United States.  Demographic characteristics of individuals are
obtained from administrative records at the U.S. Census Bureau.  The bridge between the workers and
the firms is the Unemployment Insurance (UI) wage records from the state of Maryland.
Every quarter, all employers subject to state Unemployment Insurance (UI) laws are required
to submit quarterly contribution reports detailing their monthly employment and quarterly wages to
the State Employment Security Agencies.  The employer also provides quarterly wages for every
employee.  These data on individual employees are known as the wage records, and are used by the
states to manage their unemployment insurance program.  The UI wage records have been used by
many previous authors for research into worker flows, job flows, and the earnings effects of labor
reallocation -- see, for example, Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993), Anderson and Meyer
(1994), Lane, Miranda, Spletzer, and Burgess (1999), and Burgess, Lane, and Stevens (2000).  In this
paper, we use wage records from the state of Maryland from the second quarter of 1985 through the
third quarter of 1997.  This dataset consists of 108,254,142 observations on 5,006,622 workers and
262,062 employers.
                                                     
14  We should note that our linked employer-employee dataset has been created under strict protocols within the
confidential firewalls at the U.S. Census Bureau.  Following Census Bureau policy, the resulting micro analytic
database can be used only for statistical purposes, and the output from such statistical analysis is carefully
reviewed to ensure the confidentiality of individual households and businesses.21
The main advantage of the UI wage records is their coverage of essentially a universe of
workers and employers.
15  Another advantage of the wage records data is the ability to construct
longitudinal linkages for both individuals and employers.  We have linked the UI wage records across
quarters, using the employer as the unit of analysis.  To ensure that we do not falsely define businesses
that are involved in ownership changes as births and deaths, we use information on worker flows to
distinguish administrative changes in employer identification numbers from true births and deaths.
Perhaps the main drawback to the UI wage records data is the lack of even the most basic
demographic information on workers.  We overcome this by linking the UI microdata to
administrative data residing at the Census Bureau which contains information such as date of birth,
place of birth, and gender.  We are also particularly interested in the educational composition of the
workforce.  We were able to directly obtain education information on a sample of the workforce via
other administrative data links to the long form of the decennial census.
16  Since education can change
for workers aged 18-24, we subset the data to only include workers over age 25.  We then follow
Angrist and Krueger (1991) in using detailed place of birth, month of birth, year of birth, race, and
gender to impute education for the balance of the workforce.
The information in the UI wage records is also quite limited with regard to characteristics of
the employer.  We link the UI data to the Standard Statistical Establishment List (SSEL), which is the
Census Bureau's business register.  All SSEL information about individual businesses is confidential
under Title 13, Unites States Code.  The SSEL is the source of basic employment and payroll
measures summarized by industry and geographic area in the Annual County Business Patterns series,
and the SSEL also serves as a resource for research into topics such as longitudinal business
demographics.  Walker (1997) provides an excellent description of the SSEL.  We use the natural log
                                                     
15  The state based UI system provides a virtual census (98 percent) of employees on nonfarm payrolls.  The
major exclusions from private sector UI coverage are agricultural employees, self employed workers, private
household workers, unpaid family workers, and employees in small nonprofit organizations.
16  The long form is only sent to 1/6 of households.22
of payroll per worker as our measure of earnings in the empirical work below, and we use the natural
log of sales per worker as our measure of productivity.
17  Because of concerns about price variation or
variation in capital usage that vary across years and industries, most of the empirical work below uses
data measured as deviations from year and four-digit industry means.
The analytical dataset that we construct from these merged files has the employer as the unit
of analysis.  We aggregate the individual worker data into summary measures for each firm.  For
example, we construct firm level proportions of workers under age 30, between 30 and 55, and over
55.  We construct the proportion of the firm's workforce that is female and the proportion that is
foreign born.  We also construct firm level proportions of workers with low, medium, and high
amounts of education (where these categories roughly correspond to less than high school, high school
graduates and those with some college, and college graduates).  The resulting dataset has annual
observations on essentially every firm in the State of Maryland between 1985 and 1997.
We impose a series of restrictions before turning to the analysis.  We restrict the data to those
firms in the UI with a valid match to the SSEL, and we keep single establishment firms with
nonmissing sales data in the SSEL.
18  While restricting attention to single establishment firms has
limitations for some purposes, it is not a major concern in the current context where we want to focus
on the dynamics in the first few years after entry.  As Spletzer (2000) has shown, almost 90 percent of
                                                     
17  As described by Haltiwanger, Lane, and Spletzer (1999), the sales to employment ratio should be regarded as
a proxy for labor productivity since revenue is divided by employment rather than hours, and the GDP deflator is
used rather than the appropriate firm specific price deflator.  Variation in hours per worker may vary
systematically across types of businesses because of, for example, the use of part-time workers – by controlling
for 4-digit effects we have abstracted from differences in hours per worker across 4-digit industries.  Still, one
could easily imagine that within the same narrowly defined industry that some businesses have chosen to use
part-time workers more intensively than others – thus, one of the sources of between business variation we may
be capturing is this type of variation in the choice of the role of part-time workers.
18  Each of these restrictions is somewhat severe in terms of losing observations.  The Maryland UI data
identifies firms with a state-specific identifier, whereas the SSEL identifies firms with a federal identifier.
We have the crosswalk between these two identifiers for 1988 Q1 and 1992 Q1.  This implies that all births
after 1992 Q1 and all deaths before 1988 Q1 will not be in the merged dataset  Because the sales data in the
SSEL is reported at the EIN level rather than the establishment level, and because most births are single
establishment births, we have chosen to delete multi-establishment companies from our analysis.23
entering establishments are single unit firms and thus we have the set of firms that dominate entry
dynamics.  Because of concerns about partial year data, we delete observations from 1985 and 1997
and we delete observations in the year of birth and the year of death.  We further restrict our data to
firms not in the agriculture and public administration industries, and we delete observations in the top
and bottom 1% of the productivity and earnings distributions.
Since the focus of the paper is on the evolution and selection of newly-born firms, we create
several analytical datasets.  The first dataset consists of a balanced panel of firms that exist every year
1985-1997.  There are 22,420 of these firms,  with full information available in 116,461 employer-
year observations (sales data are missing in the SSEL in 1988, 1989, 1990 and1993; sales data are, on
average, missing for 32 percent of single establishments in the other years)  The average firm in the
balanced panel has 11.9 employees.  This balanced panel is the sample of mature firms from which we
estimate the β  coefficients in the JMP decompositions.  The data in Figure 1 are from this balanced
panel.  The second dataset consists of firms born within the 1985-1990 period; we restrict on births in
these years so we can observe their growth and survival during their initial six years of life.  There are
20,338 such births, contributing 48,664 employer-year observations.  Of these births, 14,722 survive
for at least six years, and these successful births contribute 39,981 employer-year observations.
7.  Basic Patterns in the Relationship between Productivity, Earnings, and Worker Mix
 Table 2 presents very basic regressions relating productivity, earnings, and worker mix.  The
regressions in table 2 use the simple specification described in section 5 to relate firm-level outcomes
to the characteristics of the workers employed by the firm.  We find that firms in our data have higher
measures of labor productivity and earnings if they have workforces with a higher fraction of foreign
born workers, a lower fraction of female workers, a higher fraction of prime age workers, and a higher24
fraction of more educated workers.
19  Many of these coefficients are statistically significant.  While the
estimates vary somewhat across the age of businesses (which our theoretical arguments suggest should
happen), the slopes of the productivity and wage profiles with respect to worker characteristics appear
to be qualitatively similar across businesses of different ages.
It is tempting of course to compare the magnitudes of the coefficients in the productivity and
earnings regressions and draw inferences regarding the extent to which different workers are being
paid their marginal products.
20  For example, it appears that increasing the percentage of highly
educated workers raises earnings per worker more than output per worker.  Our discussion of the
simple theoretical model in section 4 cautions against interpreting such interesting findings as
implying that, in this case, highly educated workers are being paid more than their marginal products.
Our theory and evidence presented above suggests that, amongst other things, there are inherently
unobserved factors “k” that may influence productivity and wages differentially.  These factors are
likely to be correlated with our measures of worker characteristics and as such, it is important to
interpret the coefficients in Table 2 as reflecting the empirical covariances between productivity,
earnings, and worker characteristics.  Along related lines, the resolution of uncertainty may have
                                                     
19  Haltiwanger, Lane, and Spletzer (1999) note that the female coefficient in these regressions requires
special interpretation.  Because we are using employment rather than hours in the denominator of the
productivity and the earnings variables, these coefficients might be biased downward if the propensity to
work part-time is greater for females.  More generally of course, there may be many factors that influence
the productivity and earnings effects that are outside the scope of the type of theoretical considerations we
have discussed.  Rather than take on those issues directly here, we take the approach here that we are
interested in the connection between productivity, earnings, and a variety of different indicators of worker
mix.  It would be of interest to consider the respective contribution (and the associated interpretation) of
each of the indicators we have separately.
20  For example, Hellerstein, Neumark and Troske (1999) present analysis that compares slopes of similarly
specified earnings and productivity profiles in order to examine questions of discrimination.  As they carefully
show there are important issues of functional forms that can influence tests of the productivity versus earnings
differentials.  Since such tests are not the focus of our analysis we do not attempt to investigate the sensitivity to
functional form issues in the same manner.25
differential impacts on wages and productivity so that the slopes of the estimated profiles for young
businesses have additional sources of possible differences between the profiles.
21
While some caution is called for, it is also the case that it is interesting to compare the
coefficients – especially since we are interested in using the patterns in these coefficients in empirical
exercises that follow.  The last columns on the right of Table 2 report differences in the coefficients for
each of the respective worker characteristic variables and a test of statistical significance.  For the
balanced panel, we find that the coefficient in the productivity equation is less than that in the wage
equation for foreign born, older and more educated workers.  Again, for the balanced panel, we find
that the coefficient in the productivity equation is greater than that in the wage equation for female,
younger and less educated workers.  All of these differences are statistically significant.  For the
younger businesses, the pattern of the difference in coefficients is roughly similar but somewhat more
erratic and less statistically significant.  An interesting aspect of these findings is that whatever factors
are driving the differences in the productivity and earnings coefficients are apparently more important
for well-established businesses.  Since uncertainty would presumably be less important for mature
businesses, this suggests that the wedge between productivity and wages for mature businesses must
be driven by other factors.
While the inherently difficult to measure or observe components of “k” make some inferences
difficult (like interpreting slope comparisons), recall that our theory offers predictions about how the
                                                     
21  It is true that we have some reasonable conjectures about the nature of the biases induced by unobservable
“k” for particular specifications.  For example, consider the example sketched out in section 4 but abstracting
from uncertainty (Figure 4).  In that example, we abstracted from rent sharing and internal labor market
considerations and thus k only influences wages indirectly via s while k influences productivity both directly and
indirectly via s.  In addition, in that example the production process exhibited k-skill complementarity so higher
k yielded higher s.  Under this scenario, the “bias” in the coefficient on s in the productivity equation abstracting
from uncertainty should be positive – that is, the coefficient should reflect both the direct impact of s on
productivity and the fact that s should have a positive covariance with k and k is unobservable and thus not
included in the empirical specification.  The implication is that under this strict specification (abstracting from
both uncertainty and rent sharing considerations), the estimated coefficient on s in the productivity equation
should exceed the analogous coefficients in the wage equation.  The results in Table 2 tend to reject this strict
specification (abstracting from uncertainty with no rent sharing and internal labor market considerations, etc.)
since the coefficients on “s” for wages tend to exceed those for productivity.26
nature of these covariances should evolve over the life cycle of a business and moreover how the
worker characteristics should evolve over the life cycle.  It is the latter predictions that we can analyze
even without measures of “k” and it is these predictions that we investigate in the analysis that
follows.
22
8.  Empirical Analysis
8A.  Learning: Changes in Productivity and Earnings
We now investigate the evidence for and the consequences of firms learning about their type.
Our interest here is to characterize the overall nature of dispersion of productivity and earnings, its
evolution over time, and decompose the sources of its change.
Using our sample of successful births, the productivity and earnings dynamics are given in
table 3.
 23  An examination of Table 3 demonstrates that successful births exhibit systematic changes in
the mean and variance of productivity and earnings during their first six years: as the firm ages, the
mean productivity falls, the mean earnings rises, and the standard deviation of both productivity and
earnings falls.
24
                                                     
22  There are some other possible strategies to deal with “k”.  For example, in section 3, we provide some
exploratory analysis of potential observable indicators of “k”.  However, as noted in the analysis in that section,
it appears that there are important unobservable components of “k”.  Note that in addition to trying to measure
“k” directly, it would be possible to exploit the panel nature of the data for continuing businesses to attempt to
abstract from the influence of “k” using fixed effect techniques.  We plan on pursuing these ideas in future
research.
23  In all of the forthcoming analysis in tables 3-6, all data have year and four digit industry means removed.
24  One hypothesis of the falling dispersion of earnings and productivity is that it simply reflects a statistical
artifact due to successful businesses growing under the accompanying hypothesis of a random assignment of
heterogeneous workers across businesses.  That is, suppose that workers are heterogeneous in terms of
productivity and are paid their marginal products but workers are just randomly assigned to businesses.
Moreover, suppose that new businesses grow.  Then, for a sample of new businesses that grow, the businesses
will exhibit falling dispersion in earnings and productivity as businesses will inherently become more
statistically similar as they grow.  While we think the evidence is overwhelmingly against the hypothesis of
random assignment of workers, we nevertheless conducted some further robustness checks since some elements
of this statistical artifact hypothesis might operate even without complete random assignment as it is true that
new successful businesses exhibit positive growth (on average).  In particular, we examined the patterns of
change in productivity and earnings dispersion for alternative groups of successful businesses.  One check we
made was based upon initial size – we classified businesses into quartiles based upon initial size.  We found that
the pattern of falling dispersion holds even more strongly for businesses in the top quartile as for the bottom
quartile of initial size.  This evidence does not support the statistical artifact hypothesis since this hypothesis27
The JMP decompositions of the sources of changes in the declining productivity and earnings
dispersion are presented in the top two panels of table 4.  We find that changes in the distribution of
worker characteristics and the differentials associated with those characteristics account for a modest
fraction of the falling dispersion in productivity and a substantial fraction of the falling dispersion in
wages.
25  Specifically, changes in the distribution of worker characteristics account for 3% of the
decline in the 90-10 ratio of productivity during the first six years, and changes in the differentials
(i.e., estimated regression coefficients) account for 5% of this decline.  Changes in the distribution of
worker characteristics account for 34% of the decline in the 90-10 ratio of earnings during the first six
years, and changes in the differentials account for 43% of this decline.  This implies that 92% of the
declining productivity dispersion is due to unobservables, whereas 22% of the declining earnings
dispersion is due to unobservables.  In terms of the simpler intermediate decomposition in equation
(6), these results suggest that only 3% of the decline in productivity dispersion can be interpreted as
arising from reduced dispersion in worker mix and only 34% of the decline in earnings dispersion can
be interpreted to reduced dispersion in worker mix.  The vast majority of the decline is associated with
changing deviations from the long run earnings/worker mix profile (i.e., residuals).
                                                                                                                                                                     
should be of particular relevance for the smallest businesses.  Second, we classified new businesses into growth
rate quartiles based upon growth over the first six years of existence.  We found that the pattern of falling
dispersion holds for all growth rate quartiles – moreover, the lowest quartile has strong negative growth while
the top quartile has strong positive growth.  It is true that the quantitative decrease in dispersion is somewhat
greater for the growth rate group in the top quartile.  However, under pure random assignment, we should
actually see dispersion rising for the lowest quartile group (as they are getting smaller) and dispersion falling for
the highest quartile group.  Our interpretation of these robustness checks is that the falling dispersion in
productivity and earnings is not being driven by this statistical artifact hypothesis.  Moreover, the other evidence
we have presented does not support random assignment.  Such evidence includes the finding of persistent
heterogeneity amongst mature businesses in earnings, productivity and worker mix and the finding of rising
mean earnings and falling mean productivity amongst new businesses.
25  Recall that the ordering in the JMP decomposition does not impact the contribution of the unobservables so
the combined contribution of changes in worker characteristics and differentials is robust to ordering as well.
When we change the ordering placing the contribution of the changing differentials prior to changes in the
characteristics, we largely get the same patterns as reported in Table 4.  There is a modest increase in the
contribution of changes in the distribution of characteristics but we still find that changes in the distribution of
characteristics matter a lot for earnings but not for productivity.  We also find that changes in the differentials
still contribute substantially for earnings but not for productivity (actually they modestly go the “wrong” way).28
How do these decomposition results fit with the predictions of the learning model?  There are
several facets of the results that we discuss in turn and, in so doing, it is important to recall that some
of the predictions of the model depend on the assumptions regarding the initial distribution of beliefs.
One prediction of the model that does not depend upon the latter is that we should observe a reduction
in the overall dispersion of residuals from the long run profile.  We observe that this prediction holds
for both productivity and wages.  With regard to other predictions, the declining overall dispersion of
productivity and earnings is, at first glance, consistent with the assumption that the variance of initial
beliefs about type exceeds the variance of true types so that learning yields falling dispersion in
productivity, earnings, and worker mix as firms age.  However, the weak contribution of changes in
the distribution of worker characteristics raises doubts that the falling overall dispersion in
productivity is due to businesses having an initial dispersion of beliefs about type that exceeded the
true dispersion in types.  It is also the case that the changes in dispersion resulting from worker mix
effects are not supportive of the hypothesis that all firms had common (identical) initial beliefs at
entry.
It is interesting that changes in the distribution of worker characteristics account for a greater
fraction of the changes in dispersion of earnings than productivity.  This finding is consistent with the
prediction that deviations from the long run profile are less likely to be important in accounting for
changes in earnings dispersion.  The reason is that mistakes about “k” may only (or primarily) have an
impact on changes in earnings dispersion through changes in the workforce mix while these same
mistakes imply a falling contribution of deviations from the long run profile for productivity.  We also
know, however, from Table 2 that, if anything, the slope of the earnings/skill mix profile is steeper
than the productivity/skill mix profile.  Thus, any change in the distribution of worker characteristics
will have a larger impact on earnings dispersion than on productivity dispersion.
                                                                                                                                                                     
We focus on the ordering in Table 4 in the text because this ordering provides the most straightforward evidence
on the contribution of changes in the distribution of worker characteristics.29
We also find that changes in the slopes of the earnings and productivity profiles tend to
decrease rather than increase dispersion – although the contribution of changing slopes for
productivity is very small.  The implied flattening of the schedules is consistent with the hypothesis
that firms had similar or common initial beliefs that led to a steeper initial profile than the long run
profile.  However, since the changes in slope matter mostly for earnings, it may be (as we will discuss
further below) that there are other factors contributing to the earnings dynamics beyond the learning
effects emphasized in our model.  If, for example, the propensity for rent sharing increases over the
lifetime of a business, this could potentially yield a weaker relationship between earnings and
characteristics as a business ages.  Moreover, for earnings, taken together the contribution of changes
in the distribution of worker characteristics and changes in the differentials associated with those
characteristics work in the “wrong” way for the changes in earnings dispersion to be entirely driven by
learning effects.  That is, the changes due to distribution of worker characteristics suggest that initially
var(K)>var(k) while the changes due to differentials suggest that initially var(K)<var(k).  In short,
there are some interesting dynamics for young businesses involving the interaction of changing worker
characteristics and earnings differentials associated with those characteristics that appear to involve
factors other than learning.
            The results in Table 3 also show that mean productivity falls and mean earnings rises during
the first six years of the successful birth's lifecycle.  This difference in trends is, at first glance,
somewhat puzzling since our model suggests that average earnings also captures some portion of
average productivity, and thus mean earnings and mean productivity should move in the same
direction.  To further investigate this divergence, we present results from a JMP decomposition on the
means in the bottom two panels of table 4.  We find that changes in worker mix alone during the first
six years would lead to falling mean earnings and falling mean productivity, and changes in the
regression coefficients would account for a relatively small increase in both means.  Therefore, the
opposite trends we observe are primarily accounted for by changes in unobservable characteristics.30
            There could be a number of explanations for why unobservable factors explain the different
trends in mean productivity and earnings.  The decline in mean productivity might reflect mean-
reverting tendencies for successful firms to have high initial draws of productivity (that is, high θ
shocks).  The increase in mean earnings might reflect an increasing share of rents as a business ages –
in terms of the simple descriptive model, it may be that the rent sharing fraction (δ ) increases with the
age of the business.  We do not have a formal explanation of why rent sharing would vary in this
systematic way – however; it seems plausible that survival probabilities are related to the ability to
enter with low initial wages and implicit commitments of higher future wages upon success (i.e.,
survival).  A related possibility is that the productivity and earnings measures may capture different
dimensions of entrepreneurial effort that are important in the first few years of a business’s existence.
It is possible that entrepreneurs put in long hours at the birth of a business and pay themselves very
little salary, reversing this pattern as the business ages.  This would be consistent with a falling mean
sales-per-worker ratio and an increasing mean earnings-per-worker ratio.  We believe that
investigating the robustness of and the explanations for the opposite trends of mean earnings and mean
productivity is an interesting area for future research.
To sum up, there are striking and systematic changes in the mean and dispersion of
productivity and earnings per worker in the first several years after the birth of a cohort of firms.
Some of these patterns (in particular, the reduced dispersion from deviations from long run profiles)
are clearly consistent with the hypothesized effects of learning.  There are, however, significant
differences in the patterns of the findings across productivity and earnings.  These differences are not
inconsistent with learning effects per se but do suggest, especially for earnings, that other factors are
playing a role in the evolution of the relationship between earnings per worker and worker
characteristics.  Perhaps this is not surprising as firm-specific components of earnings determination31
are likely to evolve over the life cycle of new businesses and to vary with worker characteristics as
well.
8B.  Learning: Changes in Worker Mix
In this part of the empirical analysis, we are interested in describing how firms adjust their
workforce in response to their initial errors in knowing their type.  The theory predicts that firms with
positive surprises in initial productivity are more likely to have underestimated k and will exhibit
increases in skill, and firms with negative surprises in initial productivity are more likely to have
overestimated k and will exhibit decreases in skill.  The dependent variable we use to measure changes
in skill is a change in a skill index from the second year to the sixth year for a successful entrant
(measured formally as (X6-X2)β , where Xt is the vector of workforce composition variables in the t
th
year after birth, and β  is the vector of regression coefficients estimated from the balanced panel from
the productivity regression on worker characteristics).
26  We measure the change in skill between years
2 and 6 to avoid problems with measures of initial year productivity as explanatory variables in the
regression.
In column 1 of table 5, we regress the change in the productivity skill index on the firm's
initial productivity error.  We find that those firms with positive errors (such as firm 1 in figure 5 that
underestimated its k) tend to increase their skill mix, and those firms with negative errors (such as firm
3 in figure 3 that overestimated its k) tend to decrease their skill mix.  To see whether this result might
be driven by regression to the mean effects, we control for the initial worker skill mix by including the
initial predicted productivity in column 2.
27  The coefficient on the initial error is reduced somewhat
                                                     
26  We have also replicated the analysis in Table 4 using the earnings specification.  We find qualitatively similar
results although they are somewhat less strong and estimated less precisely.  Part of the reason for this is that the
implications for responses to “errors” may not carry over to earnings.  In the absence of rent sharing, there is no
sense in which the gap between actual and predicted earnings reflects an error.
27  Of course, learning is a potential source of regression to the mean effects but there may be other factors
generating regression to the mean effects in the worker mix.  By controlling for initial worker mix, we abstract
from such factors and focus on the impact of the “error” made in the choice of worker mix.32
but remains positive and statistically significant.  Finally, in column 3, using indicator variables for
whether the firm's initial error is in the top or bottom third of the error distribution, we find that the
largest changes in skill are from firms in the bottom third of the error distribution decreasing their skill
levels.
We interpret these results as saying that the initial error in choosing skill level has important
empirical content.  This is consistent with the view that new firms systematically experiment with their
mix of workers as they learn about their type.
8C.  Selection
As discussed earlier, our theory has specific predictions about both selection and learning.
With regard to selection, we present simple OLS death regressions in Table 6.  For each cohort of
entering businesses, we define an indicator variable that is equal to one if the business does not survive
within the first six years and zero otherwise.  In the first column, we regress this indicator of death
within the first six years on the firm's actual productivity in its first year.  We find that the firms with
initially low productivity are more likely to exit.  This is in keeping with the theoretical predictions,
where we expect that firms with lower levels of initial productivity are more likely to be close to the
marginal firm (i.e., close to the fixed cost threshold at which exit is optimal).
28
In keeping with the theoretical analysis, and with the visual depiction in Figures 4 and 5, we
decompose actual productivity into two parts: the component that is on the long run productivity/skills
locus, and the residual.  The former is where the firm expects to be given its chosen skill mix, and the
latter is what we term the firm's error in identifying its type.  In addition to the predicted component
                                                     
28  This result is mirrored in a death regression that uses earnings instead of productivity: we find that firms with
low initial earnings are likely to exit.  At first glance, this result might seem counter-intuitive: one would expect
that all else equal, firms with lower earnings would have higher expected profits and thus be more likely to
survive.  One explanation for this finding is that low earnings reflects low skill, and skill is chosen based upon
the firm's expectation of type.  Indeed, in the model, wages w(s) are equal to [(1-δ )ω (s)+δ {θ f(k,s)-F}], and in the
presence of rent sharing (δ >0), wages are a function of k and thus become an alternative measure of productivity.
When we estimate a death regression with actual productivity and actual earnings as explanatory variables, both33
signaling the firm's belief about its type k, we expect firms that make optimistic errors about k will
exhibit negative productivity errors, which leads to firms learning that they are lower k and therefore a
greater likelihood of exit.  These hypotheses are empirically valid: the coefficients in column 2 are
negative and statistically significant.  Interestingly, the coefficient on the predicted component of
productivity is substantially larger in magnitude than the coefficient on the error component.  One
interpretation for this result is that the observed worker mix is a good proxy for type and thus a good
predictor for productivity, whereas the error is a noisy predictor of type (as it should be) but
nevertheless has predictive power in terms of predicting survival.
We now extend the analysis to examine whether there are asymmetries in how various parts of
the distributions of the predicted and error components of initial productivity influence exit.  In
column 3 of table 6, we find that firms that choose worker characteristics that map into the lower third
of the predicted productivity distribution are more likely to exit.  Consistent with our prediction that
overly optimistic mistakes about type matter for survival, we find that firms with errors in the lower
third of that distribution are more likely to exit.  However, we find that firms with errors in the upper
third of that distribution are not less likely to exit.  Thus, there is an interesting asymmetry in the
response to errors.
This interesting asymmetry is outside the scope of the simple selection model we have
sketched.  The latter predicts that firms with negative errors should be more likely to exit and firms
with positive errors should be less likely to exit.  We find that it is only negative errors that matter
here.  A potential explanation for this finding (outside of the model we have sketched) is that negative
errors have a direct impact on productivity and profitability.  That is, the mismatch between type and
worker mix may have direct adverse consequences, particularly for those that are overly optimistic.  It
will also be the case that overly optimistic firms will be paying the higher wages that go along with the
                                                                                                                                                                     
come in with statistically significant negative coefficients.  We interpret this to mean that both earnings and
productivity are noisy measures of underlying firm type.34
higher skill mix.  It seems plausible that firms with such a mismatch problem might find themselves in
difficulty and be more likely to exit.
9.  Concluding Remarks
We began this study by exploiting a rich new employer-employee dataset to find substantial
and persistent differences in earnings per worker, output per worker, and worker mix across businesses
within narrowly defined industries.  We found that these remained even after controlling for other
observable characteristics.  We argued that these were all manifestations of the same underlying
dynamic: the type of firm that generated these differences.  We sketched a model in which businesses
deliberately choose different worker mixes because of differences in their types and productivity
interactions (e.g., k-skill complementarity) between the type of business and the mix of workers.
Following the industrial organization literature, we posited that businesses learn about their types over
time so there is churning and evolution of the worker mix at businesses and this is related to the
observed earnings and productivity dynamics.  In order to understand the dynamics underlying the
choice of workforce composition, our empirical analysis focused on the productivity and earnings
dynamics of young businesses.
We found that, at entry, successful (i.e., surviving) new businesses exhibit substantially higher
than industry-average productivity and substantially lower than industry-average earnings per worker
– interestingly, however, as the business ages there is convergence between productivity and earnings.
We also found that new businesses exhibit even greater heterogeneity in earnings and
productivity than do mature businesses, but that two factors contribute to the lower earnings dispersion
of mature businesses.  First, new firms learn to adjust their workforce composition as they age.
Second, new firms with low initial productivity, or that make initial mistakes about their type
(particularly those that are overly optimistic), are more likely to exit.
These results on earnings and productivity dynamics are of interest in their own right but our
focus has been to examine the contribution of the choice and evolution of worker mix to these35
dynamics.  When we did this, we found that unobservable factors dominate the observed changes in
the distribution of productivity - consistent with the learning model.  However, the failure of worker
characteristics to account for much of the considerable decline in productivity dispersion is somewhat
puzzling.
The results for changes in earnings dispersion are quite different on some dimensions.  As
with productivity, overall dispersion fell and changes in the distribution of unobservable factors
contributes substantially to this decline.  Here, however, changes in the distribution of worker
characteristics and changes in the differentials associated with those characteristics play a substantial
role.  The importance of worker characteristics is potentially consistent with the theory, given the
uncertainty about firm type.  However learning does not explain why both workforce mix adjustment
and adjustment in differentials act to reduce earnings dispersion.  In addition, the substantial
differences in the adjustment process for earnings and productivity suggest that some other factors are
playing a role in the interaction between earnings and worker characteristics for young businesses.
In sum, this paper extends a very basic result from the empirical industrial organization
literature – namely that learning and selection effects matter for firm dynamics – to the labor
economics literature in showing that this experimentation process involves the choice of worker mix in
both the selection and the learning process.  Put differently, new firms struggle to find their way in
deciding how to undertake production and run a business – some do not succeed and fail while others
learn and prosper.  In this sense, our results, although derived from a new dataset, are very consistent
with both the rich empirical literature documenting marked differences in firm behavior within
industries, and the explicit theoretical understanding of the impact of different initial endowments –
like managerial skill, physical and organizational capital – on firm outcomes.
There are clearly aspects of the results that require further research.  A particularly interesting
result is investigating the contribution of rent sharing and internal labor market considerations to the
different dynamics between average earnings and productivity as firms age.  In addition, it would be36
useful to investigate the interaction between different types of k and different sets of worker
characteristics on earnings and productivity.  A question that we do not directly address but which is
equally interesting is the impact of these firm dynamics on workers.  In particular, we know that the
types of firms which are more likely to exit are those which are low productivity, with a low level of
workforce skill.  We also know from the recent literature that this entry and exit plays an important
role in productivity growth, yet that the effects of involuntary job loss can be large and persistent, at
least for long tenure mature workers.  Quantifying and understanding the potential economy wide
gains in productivity from this process of creative destruction and adjustment via the costs borne by
workers should be an important area for future research.37
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6Figure 2: Productivity, Earnings and Worker-Mix in Restaurant Industry
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2Figure 3: Productivity, Earnings and Worker-Mix in Plumbing Industry
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2Figure 4:  No uncertainty, No rent sharing, Linear Wages
       Three different values of kFigure 5:  The link between k, skill, and productivity




































































Sample Size 4,168 9,389 116,461
Descriptive Statistics are presented before removing Year & 4-Digit SIC means.
Productivity = Ln{ [Annual Sales ($1000) / GDP Deflator] / March 12th Employment }
Earnings = Ln{ [1st Quarter Payroll / GDP Deflator] / March 12th Employment }.Table 2:  Regression Analysis








































% Foreign Born     .085
   (.053)
    .080 *
   (.032)
    .068 *
   (.011)
    .031
   (.043)
    .042
   (.027)
    .097 *
   (.010)
    .053
   (.055)
    .038
   (.032)
   -.030*
   (.011)
% Female    -.181 *
   (.041)
   -.134 *
   (.027)
   -.181 *
   (.008)
   -.398 *
   (.033)
   -.431 *
   (.022)
   -.562 *
   (.007)
    .217*
   (.042)
    .297*
   (.026)
    .382*
   (.008)
% Age <30    -.030
   (.041)
    .046
   (.042)
   -.018
   (.010)
   -.213 *
   (.033)
   -.141 *
   (.035)
   -.145 *
   (.009)
    .183*
   (.042)
    .187*
   (.041)
    .127*
   (.010)
% Age >55    -.189 *
   (.071)
   -.230 *
   (.036)
   -.206 *
   (.010)
   -.170 *
   (.058)
   -.217 *
   (.030)
   -.160 *
   (.009)
   -.019
   (.074)
   -.013
   (.035)
   -.046*
   (.010)
% Low Educated    -.150 *
   (.049)
   -.215 *
   (.039)
   -.181 *
   (.010)
   -.280 *
   (.040)
   -.188 *
   (.033)
   -.249 *
   (.008)
    .130*
   (.051)
   -.027
   (.038)
    .069*
   (.010)
% High Educated     .142
   (.075)
    .070
   (.052)
    .128 *
   (.018)
    .093
   (.061)
    .145 *
   (.043)
    .209 *
   (.016)
    .048
   (.078)
   -.076
   (.051)
   -.082*















All regressions include an intercept and an indicator for whether initial employment exceeds 100.  The successful birth regressions include
      cohort dummies.  The balanced paned regressions include controls for age.






1 Year After Birth  .076 .737 1 Year After Birth -.075 .619
2 Years After Birth  .063 .704 2 Years After Birth -.050 .616
3 Years After Birth  .049 .700 3 Years After Birth -.041 .627
4 Years After Birth  .038 .704 4 Years After Birth -.043 .609
5 Years After Birth  .038 .696 5 Years After Birth -.035 .594
6 Years After Birth  .017 .686 6 Years After Birth -.043 .591
All data have Year & 4-Digit SIC means removed.


























123456Table 4:  Productivity & Earnings Dynamics, 6-year Successful Births














1 Year After Birth 1.830  .215 -.010 1.626




















1 Year After Birth 1.555  .486 -.062 1.131




















1 Year After Birth  .076  .019 -.002  .059




















1 Year After Birth -.075  .022 -.006 -.091
6 Years After Birth -.043  .002  .001 -.046






X = [% Foreign Born, % Female, % Age <30, % Age >55, % Low Educated, % High Educated].
Coefficient estimates are from table 2.  All data have Year & 4-Digit SIC means removed.  Productivity and
       earnings per worker are in logs.Table 5:  Skill Index Change Regressions, 1990 Successful Births
(1) (2) (3)
X*β : Predicted
           Productivity
   -.244 *
   (.024)
   1 if Bottom 1/3 of
         Distribution
    .026 *
   (.006)
   1 if Top 1/3 of
         Distribution
   -.023 *
   (.006)
Error: Actual -
          Predicted
    .010 *
   (.003)
    .008 *
   (.003)
   1 if Bottom 1/3 of
         Distribution
   -.015 *
   (.005)
   1 if Top 1/3 of
         Distribution
   -.003
   (.006)
R-Squared .008 .097 .076
All regressions include an intercept.  Sample size=1051.
Dependent Variable is [X(year 6 after birth) - X(year 2 after birth)]* β (Productivity);  mean=-.0030.
All explanatory variables are measured as of the first year after birth.  β  is estimated from the balanced panel.
All data (except intercept) have Year & 4-Digit SIC means removed.  Productivity per worker is in logs.Table 6:  Probability of Death Regressions, 1986 & 1990 Births
(1) (2) (3)
Actual Productivity    -.039 *
   (.007)
X*β : Predicted
           Productivity
   -.271 *
   (.057)
   1 if Bottom 1/3 of
         Distribution
    .053 *
   (.014)
   1 if Top 1/3 of
         Distribution
    .011
   (.014)
Error: Actual -
          Predicted
   -.035 *
   (.007)
   1 if Bottom 1/3 of
         Distribution
    .076 *
   (.014)
   1 if Top 1/3 of
         Distribution
    .011
   (.014)
R-Squared .031 .033 .035
All regressions include an intercept and cohort dummies.  Sample size=6631.
Dependent Variable (before removing year and 4-digit SIC means) = 1 if establishment does not survive 6 years,
       0 otherwise;  mean (before removing year and 4-digit SIC means) = .3714.
All explanatory variables are measured as of the first year after birth.  β  is estimated from the balanced panel.
All data (except intercept and cohort dummies) have Year & 4-Digit SIC means removed.  Productivity per
       worker is in logs.